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T his is the first of a series of seven short articles to be published in consecutive issues of IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, and when taken collectively, argue that our technologies can and should be taken seriously. At this point I'm sure the reader will assert that our technologies are taken seriously, and not the least by members of the IEEE Society on Social Implications of Technology (SSIT)! But I would like to push this argument much further than most are prepared to go. I want to argue that the existence and the actions of technologies are not only important in an instrumental way, they also have important moral implications, and if technologies are truly to be given the respect they deserve, they should be held to account for their actions -not only in instrumental terms, but also in moral terms. Technologies are not innocent, and until and unless this accountability occurs, we are not taking technologies seriously.
Restricted and partial assessments of technologies are of course commonplace. Technologies of all kinds -from an edged stone to the Rosetta Philae probe -are important to human beings in cultural, scientific, and existential terms. It therefore follows that the performance of an artefact requires careful and critical assessment, and numerous strategies have been developed to this end. Some forms of technology assessment are fine-grained and small-scale, attending to specific technologies in specific contexts (Human-Computer Interface evaluations, software usability studies, user-centred design methods, and so on), while other approaches are more sweeping, and critique Technology in epochal and essentialist terms, rather than focusing this or that example (see for example Heidegger, Ullul, or Mumford).
But the argument put in this series of articles is that the normative standards by which technologies are assessed be extended from these exclusively instrumental concerns, to the noninstrumental realm ordinarily occupied exclusively by humans. It is argued that it is not only the engineers and technicians that should be held to moral account for their design work, and not only the manufacturers of the technologies, and not only the people using the technologies, but also the technologies in and of themselves. Only when technologies stand on their own feet as it were; are distinguished from their human designers, manufacturers and users, and are held to be morally accountable for their actions, can we say that those technologies and their actions are assessed appropriately, and are taken seriously.
The Normative Realm of Morality
In the Western metaphysical tradition, to be held accountable for one's actions in a moral or ethical sense is a privilege and a responsibility afforded only to humans, and non-humans (such as an animal, a rock, or a machine) are "accountable" in a much more limited sense. The limited sense in which a non-human might be held to account is the sense in which its action in a chain of events is identified -for example, a dog growls at child, unstable rocks threaten a house, car headlights fail because of faulty magneto -and remedial action is directed at the dog, the rocks or the magneto. In some limited, pragmatic sense then, the dog may be "held to account" by being disciplined, the rock formation may be "blamed" and then removed or reinforced, and the magneto identified as the "culprit" and replaced. In the same limited sense, a Doctor, an accountant, a salesperson, will not tolerate a computer system that crashes repeatedly, fails to print, or loses files. The dog, the rocks, the magneto and the computer system are held to be accountable for their role in events, and may be the focus of immediate intervention, but despite the morally laden language that is often used ("fault," "held to account," "blamed," "culprit"), the accountability of the non-human is limited. For the moral responsibility for the actions of the dog, rocks, magneto or computer system is not held to be intrinsic to those non-humans, but is held to be located in the dog's owner, the town planners that co-located the house and the rocks, the owner of the car, or the computer system's programmer or operator. Although the actions of non-human technologies may be the immediate cause of great harm, it is humans further back or further forward in the chain of causality that are held to be morally accountable for the harm. The reasons for this have been pretty much settled after a couple of thousand years of discussion among metaphysicians and moral philosophers. The actions of a non-human may be proximate in a chain of causality culminating in great harm, but a non-human is held to be beyond the realm of moral accountability on any one of six grounds. These grounds are not necessarily exhaustive, and it may be that other objections may be raised, but they do represent the most significant hurdles my argument must jump to be accepted. In each of the next six issues of the Technology and Society Magazine we will take these propositions one by one. Should a single objection be sustained, the conclusion that technologies are innocent must be supported, but if none are sustained, we must conclude that technologies can and should be held to moral account.
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This series of short articles is a heavily revised version of an earlier publication [1] . This view has a very long heritage in moral philosophy, extending at least as far back as to Aristotle, and reinforced from time to time by thinkers as eminent as Kant. The proposition is that a priori only humans, by virtue of their very humanness, may occupy a position in the moral realm. Critics may say that this claim to exclusivity is not so much the conclusion to an argument, but rather an unreasonable statement of faith in the privileged position of a particular species -a form of anthropocentric speciesism, akin to racism or sexism, and just as ill-founded and irrational. However, the a priori position does put forward a form of reasoning in support of the moral exceptionalism of the human species.
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Underpinning this line of reasoning is the view that uniquely, humans possess properties that make us morally accountable.
Properties that we humans are said to exclusively possess and that enable us to uniquely engage with morality have shifted through the centuries, and have shifted according to the form of the particular argument being made. A common human property in many of these arguments is the notion of freedom and free will. Like its overlapping cousin, self-consciousness, the premise is that humans and only humans have freedom of action, and in some variants, freedom of intentionality. Non-humans, such as animals, are said not to have this freedom as they are thought to be bound to act in a mechanistic way according to the laws of nature.
Another closely related but somewhat different property we are said to exclusively possess is rationality or the capacity to reason. and as "moral agents. "
reason, and because they respond to being acted upon in a mechanistic way, according to the laws of nature and without the guidance of reason, they act and may be acted upon without recourse to moral considerations.
Other proper ties have also been put forward from time to justify our moral exclusivity -such as the proposition that only humans possess a soul, and that only humans are made in God's image, and therefore only humans have standing in a moral realm that is, after all, the terrain defined by a supreme being. However, though this argument is frequently made, the fact that it is premised on a particular set of religious beliefs makes it less persuasive in philosophical circles than a secular argument that stands without this requirement.
A consequence of the widespread acceptance of the exclusivist argument has been that non-humans have for a long time been excluded from moral standing both as "moral patients" and as "moral agents." In the terms used by moral philosophers, a moral patent is a being to which a moral duty is owed, and a moral agent is a being with a moral duty to other moral agents and to moral patients. For many centuries animals were treated with a cruelty that most today would regard as morally repugnant on the basis that they were "mechanistic" and lacked a soul, self-awareness, free will, and a capacity to reason. Examples of cruelty are also found today, in vivisection, medical experimentation, body-part harvesting practices, the cosmetics industry, intensive farming practices, and so on, all justified according the argument that (like technologies) animals exist not in and of themselves, but to serve us, and are therefore beyond moral account in and of themselves.
A n a l t e r n a t i v e v i e w is that animals are in fact moral patients and are owed a dut y of ca re. In recent times inf luential thinkers like Peter Singer [1] have argued for this inclusion and the status of non-humans as moral patients is recognized through laws such as those prohibiting cruelty. Going beyond animals, the status of many other non-humans as moral patients has been recognized in law. The mistreatment of natural objects such as rivers, forests, lakes, and the planet's atmosphere, and of artefacts such as paintings, sculptures, and temples is unlawful, for reasons that are both pragmatic (as a means to an end) and moral (protecting beings of worth in their own right). To the extent that a lake, a mountain, or a painting is regarded as a being having value in and of itself, it has standing as a moral patient.
But the argument that we wish to put here goes well beyond this to propose that some non-humans (i.e., technologies) may be regarded as moral agents as well as moral patients. For this to be accepted and human exclusivity rejected, it needs to be shown that some nonhumans may also possess the properties of a moral agent.
In the abstract this is a reasonably easy task. For example, one may easily imagine a non-human being from other planet that possesses free will, reason, self-consciousness and so on, or one may well imagine an advanced AI system, or a Post-Human, possessing these properties. In principle at least, we have no monopoly on the properties said to be pre-requisites for moral agency.
C onversely, the necessa r y connection between these properties and being human may be challenged by imagining humans that do not have these properties. In certain times and places Africans, women, children, peasants, non-Greek speakers, albinos, non-Chinese, slaves, the disabled, old people, and so on, have been regarded as lacking the properties required to have moral standing either as patients or agents, and have been positioned in the natural domain, not the moral domain.
To further undermine the claim that there is a necessary and sufficient connection between humans and moral agency, one may consider the non-humans that are currently regarded by law to have moral agency. Corporations, governments, religious institutions, boards of directors, body corporates, and other non-human beings are commonly held to be accountable for their actions in moral as well as legal terms.
The exclusive link between humans and moral agency is also weakened by arguments that certain non-humans display the properties of a moral agent. A diverse range of animals have been observed to exhibit behaviors that imply the exercise of these proper ties, and would
Other properties have also been put forward from time to justify our moral exclusivity -such as the proposition that only humans possess a soul.
certainly be regarded as expressions of moral agency in a human. For example, Shapiro [2] is one of many observers to report cases of whales that choose to place their bodies between a ship and a harpooned whale, wolves that display complex social decision making, chimpanzees that comfort the dying, dolphins that rescue others from drowning, elephants that mourn the dead, and macaques that will starve rather than obtain food through submitting another macaque to electric shocks. Here the animals would seem to apply problem-solving reasoning, anticipate the consequences of actions, and exhibit free-will in choosing a course of behavior when they might choose otherwise. Properties thought to be prerequisites for moral agency and thought to be in the exclusive possession of humans may in these examples extend beyond humans.
The argument made here is that humanness per se is not a sufficient or necessary condition for granting or withholding moral standing and moral accountability. Some non-humans such as animals may be argued to have moral standing as patients and some animals display properties that might include them as moral agents. Other imagined non-humans such as alien beings or AIs may be moral patients and moral agents. Non-living beings such as rivers and paintings are commonly regarded as being moral patients. Conversely, many humans have been excluded as moral patients and moral agents. There is clearly no a priori reason to claim the moral domain as exclusively human.
So, it has been argued that humanness per se is not a sufficient or necessary condition for moral agency, but it has not yet been established that moral agency extends beyond humans to technologies. That argument remains to be made in the following parts of this series, and the next step in holding technologies to account for their actions is to demonstrate that technologies do in fact act in the world.
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The story so far… n Part One of the series it was suggested that in order to hold technologies to moral account a number of objections must be overcome: the argument that only humans are morally accountable, the "passive instrument" argument, the "dumb instrument" argument, the "free will" argument, and the "dilution of responsibility" argument. In Part Two, the "human exclusivity" argument was refuted, and here in Part Three the "passive instrument" objection is considered.
The Passive Instrument Argument
This particular objection to the moral inclusion of technologies asserts that technologies do not act in the world, but are acted upon by humans, or are at most, intermediaries in actions undertaken by humans. The objection is not so much that technologies do not act at all, for this is their very purpose -scissors do cut, cars do move, computers do compute, a shirt does block the sun, a pet-rock does stop the paper from blowing away. In this sense it can be readily admitted by all sides of the argument that non-humans act -they cut, move, compute, block and so on.
However, the "passive instrument" objection is not concerned with the literal fact that nonhumans act, but with the mix of human and non-human agency that is associated with the actions of a technology. Is the technology a passive instrument whose actions to cut, move, compute, or block are entirely attributable to human agency, or does the technology act in any significant way in an expression of its own agency? If the former, technology is innocent, if the latter, the option remains open to hold technology to moral account.
Humans and technologies go back a long way, and are clearly in some sort of relationship. We come together and interact in a variety of ways, and in consort humans and technologies do things and act in the world. Some of these actions are performed at the direct behest of humans (a file is printed), whilst others are autonomous in that they are prompted by triggers internal to the technology (a new page is fed to the printer), and others are requested or prompted by the technology (unknown filetype, please…). Some actions are optional for the operator (to delete a file); others are mandated by the technology (press OK to delete), or perhaps by other technical systems to which the system in question is answerable (enter username and password). Some human actions can be performed without the participation of technology, but for pragmatic reasons are not (communicating). Other actions require the participation of technologies (sending an email). Technologies thereby respond to action, intervene with their own acts, make requests for action, receive requests for action, make demands on others, and receive demands from others.
In these ways technology is an actor in human affairs, in at least the literal and weakest sense of the term -the technology acts with us, it performs actions in the world that are part and parcel of the processes and outcomes of human action and human agency. In so much as the technology acts in this weak sense, it might be held to account for its actions against instrumental criteria, which compare the technology's actions with human will for instrumental action. Where human will or human purposes are not faithfully executed by the actions of a technology, the technology might be held to be deficient in some way -to be slow, inefficient, faulty, costly, error prone, difficult to use, and so forth. The more interesting question is whether a stronger claim can be made about the actions of the technology, and about the agency of technology, which better represents its role and its place in our considerations.
A phenomenological approach to the relation between humans and artefacts supports such a stronger claim. In accordance with this stronger claim, the technology not only acts to materialize the will of the operator and/or the designer, and in so acting, satisfies the weak claim, it goes beyond this to recognize that human will does not exhaust an explanation of the actions of the human and the technology in consort. That is, the technology does not act to materialize human will in a faithful and entirely mechanistic way. Technologies are not passive instruments that merely express human desires and actions. Rather, the technology in question mediates the will of the designer, the manufacturer and the operator, and thus expresses its own agency.
This notion of mediation captures the detours, the compromises, the extended capacities, the constraints, the shifts in priorities, the altered methods, the new points of focus, the new objectives, the changed criteria, and all manner of other alterations to will that occur when one negotiates action in partnership with another. When a human uses a technology, neither are passive instruments of the other and the actions that occur are negotiated in a dance of reciprocal accommodation and resistance. Neither act in response to independent will. All acts are mediated.
When, for example, a computer system acts to receive and store an updated patient record in a medical doctor's computer system, the computer system is not simply acting in faithful and mechanistic obeisance to the doctor's will, any more than it is acting autonomously, in and of itself. Rather, by requiring data in a certain format, by requiring that certain fields be filled, by limiting the format and length of that data, by requiring that certain buttons be clicked in a certain order, by requiring that the doctor sit in a certain position to see the screen and attend to certain things on the screen, the actions of the computer can be understood as mediating the doctor's relation to the patient record (an electronic representation of the patient) and as mediating the consultation process. The doctor and the computer system thus work their way through the consultation in consort. Some tasks are completed more or less autonomously by computer or doctor, depending on respective competencies, whilst most tasks are completed together, each delegated particular responsibilities towards the task as a whole, according to respective competencies. In each case the computer system acts to shape the consultation.
To counter this argument it may be suggested that it is not the computer system that is acting in the performance of the consultation, but rather, that it is the programmer who wrote the software, or the IT company that manufactures the doctor's system, or some other humans further back in the chain. But this claim doesn't undermine the argument; it merely shifts it to another example, where the argument still applies. Just as the technology used by the doctor in the consultation does more than passively express the will of the doctor, so the technology used by the programmer in the construction of the doctor's system does more than passively express the will of the programmer, and so on, all the way upstream. Neither the doctor's technologies, nor the programmer's technologies, nor the IT company's technologies are passive and faithful extensions of human will and human action; all technologies act to a greater or lesser extent to mediate human action and human will, and to this extent express their own agency.
But even if one is prepared to concede that technologies are not passive instruments and do act, we are still a long way from concluding that technologies can be held to moral account for their actions. To support this conclusion we need to refute the proposition that although technologies act, they act as mere tools or "dumb instruments" in our hands. This task will be taken up in Part Four. 
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Technologies are Just "Dumb Instruments"
This objection to the moral accountability of technologies seeks to divert accountability for the acts of a technology from the technology itself to the technology's creators and/or operators. According to this argument the technology is an instrument that faithfully translates the instructions of its designers and operators into action. It is argued that as the technology is merely obeying human orders, and has no alternative course of action other than to obey orders, it is those who issue the orders either directly (the operator), or indirectly (the designer), who are morally responsible for outcomes, not the purely instrumental intermediary.
This "dumb instrument" objection is not sustainable, based as it is, in a series of erroneous premises and assumptions about the relationship between humans and technologies. As any engineer will acknowledge, it is clearly not the case that our technologies are designed and manufactured strictly in accordance with the pure will of humans, nor is it the case that their operation is a reflection of the will of humans and humans alone. Human will and human desire are not sufficient to "make it so" -and if this were the case, if technologies did faithfully reflect our will, their design, manufacture, and use would be the stuff of magic, not the stuff of engineering.
The design and manufacture of an artifact -whether a 50 000 year old stone axe, or a contemporary computer system -is a process of negotiating with the materiality of the world and the logic of the universe to establish possibilities and constraints for action in the world. These possibilities and constraints are imperfectly understood and emerge with the stone tool or computer system -they do not prefigure the tool or system in any comprehensive way. Technologies are in this sense not entirely of our own making, they are also made by the world in which we find ourselves, and what we do with these technologies is certainly not unilaterally determined. We negotiate with the stone and it pushes back. We argue with the code and it is recalcitrant. We are not all-powerful Gods or Wizards and we have no choice but to compromise with the obduracy of the world of things. As a consequence we are often disappointed with the way the things we make take shape and perform, but are also surprised by the unimagined possibilities that present themselves only when the stone is in the hand, or the computer system is booted. Indeed, it is clear that the qualities and characteristics of the non-human elements of the stone The world is what it is, and it is not in our control. A similar story might be told of the operators of the stone axe or the computer system. Do we not all wish that technologies were not of themselves so willful? But this too is an impulse that misreads the role of the technology. We have seen that the computer system is not simply a faithful and obedient servant executing our every whim, and nor would we wish it to be. The computer system or the stone axe prescribes certain actions, enables some, and proscribes others, and out of this negotiation new means and new ends arise. The technology shapes how we do things, shapes what we can do, and shapes what we want to do, in ways that are productive as well as constraining. Our stone and electronic tools no doubt changed us as much as we have changed them, and this two-way flow of reciprocal influence is our way of being -not a way wherein we stand unmoved whilst we change the world around us.
And so, when something goes wrong in the use of a technology, when a computer system (or a stone axe) are proximate in a chain of causality connected to bad outcomes, it is not necessarily correct to single out and blame the operator, for it is not they alone that determine and execute the means and the ends, nor is it correct to blame the many designers and manufactures of the computer system (or stone axe) for they too are constrained in certain directions and extended in unexpected others through negotiation with non-human technologies. We humans do not have it all our own way.
But this is not to say that humans are not to blame where computer systems or stone axes are implicated in wrong -that human designers, manufacturers, and operators are absolved of responsibility no matter how neglectful or reckless their actions might be, simply because their actions are always negotiated and mediated. That is not the point of the argument. The point is not to absolve humans of responsibility, but to attribute responsibility where it lies, regardless of humanness.
All human action that is mediated through the co-participation of technologies is action that is codetermined in both its means and its ends, by the participation of those technologies. Without a stone axe in the hand, both the means and the ends of the action would be different. Without napalm, cluster bombs, or anti-personnel mines, the means and the ends would be different. Without the computer system in the office, the means and the ends of office work would be different. Stone axes and computer systems are co-participants that help shape events as they emerge, by suggesting certain possibilities, by mapping out certain methods, by allowing endpoints not always foreseen. It does not make sense to argue that the designers and manufacturers of the artifact are entirely responsible for events far removed from design and manufacture. It does not make any sense to argue that the operator of the artifact is solely culpable in selecting and determining events, as though the same means and the same ends were available in the absence of the axe, or the computer system. It does make sense to make moral judgments about the acts that are co-shaped by the edged stone, or the office software. One might well say that on this or that occasion, in this or that circumstance, the act was a good act or a bad act, a moral act or an immoral act, and that the action of the axe, or the computer system, and not just the acts of the human designer, manufacturer, or operator, was good or was bad, moral or immoral. The stone in the hand energizes the blow and the skull is fractured -and this may be assessed as a good thing or a bad thing, and in either case the axe is implicated. The Doctor's computer system queries the drug prescription, and the prescription is altered -and this may be assessed as a good thing or a bad thing, and the computer system is implicated. Stone axes and computer systems are not innocent. They are co-participants in emergent good and bad.
But if technologies are not simply dumb instruments that do nothing other than execute human orders, is it possible to go further and argue that technologies have a form of "free will," and act at least partially in accordance with their will rather than human will? That is the question to be taken up next time in Part Five of the argument. 
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The Free Will Argument
The fifth objection to the inclusion of technologies in the domain of moral or ethical assessment is that unlike humans, technologies have no will, and are not free to determine their actions. Closely tied to the free will requirement is the objection that technologies have no capacity to foresee the outcomes of their actions, and without this knowledge cannot be held responsible for these outcomes. To be morally accountable, an actor must choose to act in circumstances in which they might have chosen otherwise, and they have chosen to act in this way in knowledge of the likely consequences, or where it might be reasonably expected that the actor might anticipate these consequences. It can be seen that this requirement for free will and foreknowledge of outcomes is an extension of the "dumb instrument" argument dealt with in the previous edition, and is a particular expression of the broader requirement for rationality and selfconsciousness.
Now it may be argued that some applications of artificial intelligence have demonstrated goal-setting and semi-autonomous learning capacities that might be regarded as akin to the possession of free will and knowledge of consequences. For example, a self-driving car will confront the well-known "Trolley Problem," requiring it to determine a particular course of action where other actions are open to it, and to take that action in the knowledge of the consequences. For example, the car's decision-making system may be faced with a situation where a collision is unavoidable: it can decide to do nothing and run into the back of the truck, almost certainly killing its passenger and owner, or swerve to the left, saving its owner but almost certainly killing pedestrians. In this circumstance the car's autonomous, interactive, adaptive decision-making system would no doubt held to moral account for its actions, but what of technologies that do not have these exotic decision-making capacities?
The requirement that moral actors exercise free will, and the requirement that free will be exercised in knowledge of the likely consequences, has been long been regarded as a prerequisite for moral accountability. Consider the difference between say, a cracked skull resulting from one person choosing to hit another over the head with a stone axe, and say, a cracked skull resulting from a falling coconut. It is argued that the human with the axe had the choice of action, and might have acted differently. The coconut palm did not exercise a will to release the coconut, and the coconut must obey gravity. Although the bad outcome is the same, the human exercised will, the coconut did not, the human is therefore morally accountable for the outcome and the coconut is not. Similarly, the ability to apprehend consequences has long been held to be a prerequisite, with the effect of excluding some from moral assessment -the coconut of course, but also infants, the mentally ill, and others "not of right mind."
But while it might be so that coconuts, infants, and those not of right mind are rightly excused on grounds of an absence of will and/ or an absence of knowledge of consequences, the same cannot be said in the case of computer systems or stone axes. For unlike the coconut palms, infants and those not of right mind, the computer system and the axe are technologies and as such, are designed, manufactured, and operated in consort with human will, and with forethought of consequences. Technologies are in this sense wilful and consequential: they materialize a will to act and materialize imagined consequences of that action.
The stone axe or the computer system is of course without freewill (in the sense of autonomous will), and is without certain knowledge of consequences, but they are not formed as they are, and do not act as they do, innocent of will, or separated from prescience of consequences. Technologies do not have a will of their own to exercise freely in foreknowledge of consequences, and nor do they act on their own, as autonomous beings -but nor do we. As has been argued in Parts Three and Four, the acts of humans and of technologies are not unilaterally exercised. Neither humans nor technologies are capable of magic. A will to act and the choice of action available to us is formed in relation to our capacity to act, which is mediated in conjunction with technologies and with the world. We are both in it together, Neanderthals and axes, doctors and computer systems.
Just as we act together, our will to act, our ability to act otherwise, and our prescience of means and ends, emerge in relation to one another -humans and technologies. A technology cannot be excused from the realm of will, simply because that will is not possessed independent of human design, manufacture, and operation. The edge of the axe materializes an "in order to" that stands independent of the origins of that ordering in its very materiality. The Doctor's computer system is not without purpose. The material ordering of an "in order to," of purposes, and functions, is the materialization of will, and there is nothing in any of this that might not have been other, given different human conditions and different material conditions. A stone may not have any shape whatsoever, but it may have many shapes, materializing many different relations and orderings, suggesting many strategies, foreseeing many different outcomes, depending upon the particular negotiations of human will and the materiality of the stone. A vast number of choices (but not free choices) are exercised in the design, manufacture, and use of technologies like a stone axe or computer system, and the choices that have been negotiated are material in this substance, in this place, doing this.
The doctor's system for example, may be other than it is and may act in ways other than it acts, and that it is as it is, is an act of will (but not free will), emergent as humans negotiate with non-human technologies in design, manufacture, and operation. When the anthropologists arrive from Andromeda and start looking for expressions of desire, of will, they will examine the "in order to" of constructions like stone axes and computer systems and the choices that have been made as we have negotiated means and ends with the world. Our will is not free to express as we might wish, it is constrained and it is opened out by an obdurate world that provides the resources and sets the rules for ordering. But the will we are able to express, however much compromised, is present in our technologies. In this sense, technologies do "have" will, and the choices that have been made in negotiating an "in order to" with an obdurate world are made through a process of negotiating both the means and the likely ends with the world of non-humans.
So far in this series it has been argued that moral accountability is not in principle restricted to humans (Part Two), that non-humans do act in the world (Part Three), that they are not just tools or "dumb instruments (Part Four), and that they materialize will and forethought of consequences (Part Five). Next it will be argued that "dilution of responsibility" poses no barrier to the moral accountability of technologies.
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The Dilution of Responsibility Argument
The fifth problem to overcome is es tablishing the identity of the being that is to be held to moral account. Where the being is human, the prob lem of allocating responsibility to an individual may be difficult, but the dif ficulty of establishing which individu al is accountable does not extend to determining what an individual is. A human can be identified and held to account in ways that are well estab lished, and where more than one human is involved, culpability can be distributed among a finite number of those involved in ways that are also well established. Much more difficult is establishing the identity of a tech nology, particularly in the contempo rary era of distributed technologies, though the problem also applies in the case of discrete technologies like the stone axe.
If a technology is to be held to account on any grounds -instrumen tal, legal, moral, or otherwise -we must consider ust what the technol ogy is, that is, where it begins and ends, what is part of the technology and what is not. This problem is a real one and not just semantic, for all technologies are extensive in time and space. The stone axe and the computer system are artefacts that "fold up" millions of years of geological activity and thousands of years of human practice, pulled together from places as diverse as Korean factories, Californian software houses, flint mines, and forests. So for example, one might reason ably argue that the medical Doc tor's system comprises not just the Doctor and all the particular hard ware and software that resides in the Doctor's consulting room, but also the global communications hardware and software it depends upon, and all the people and com panies and organizations respon sible for its construction, operation, and maintenance, now, and back through time; the spe cificpurpose applications software that the Doctor uses, and the system soft ware and databases that the appli cation software uses, and all of the people, companies, organi zations, tools, code libraries, and testing regimes responsible for their construction, operation, and main tenance, now, and back through time; the educational systems res ponsible for training all of the above people; the manufacturing systems responsible for designing, constructing, testing, and using all of the technologies that are part of the system, now, and back through time, and so on. Similar chains may be drawn through time and space in the case of the manufac ture of a stone axe. If we are to say that accountability is distributed among all humans and all technolo gies whose actions are implicated in a causal chain that has led to a bad outcome, the cast is so huge, the guilt spread so thin, that there is scarcely any point in attributing This is clearly a problem, but it is clearly a problem that can and has been overcome in many jurisdictions by many inquiries, inquests, and tri bunals that have been charged with the task of distributing responsibili ty for events in circumstances where many elements participated in the causal web that culminated in some accident or disaster. Accountability, in instrumental terms and in legal terms if not in moral terms, can and has been distributed through exten sive and complex systems of rami fied interaction. The question here is whether any inquiry or investigation of moral culpability, or any assess ment couched in moral or ethical terms, should regard the actions of technologies as relevant, and whe ther the distribution of normative moral accountability should include those technologies.
It seems to us that the pragmatic problems raised by the fifth objec tion are real, but are not sufficient to exclude non humans, given that there is good reason in principle to include them. If the axe or the Doc tor's computer system has acted in a way that is implicated in a bad outcome; if the outcome might have been other than bad were not for the actions of the axe or the com puter system; if the axe or computer system materialized an "in order to" that is manifest in that bad out come; if the relationship between the "in order to" and the bad out come is foreseeable; if the "in order to" might have been different, given a different will, and given a differ ent course in negotiations, then the nonhuman axe or computer system bears some responsibility for the badness of that outcome. Whether others are also responsible (say, the maker of the axe, the programmer of the computer, the educator of the programmer…), is a matter for determination. To decline to attri bute a responsibility that in principle might be attributed, simply because responsibility is distributed rather than concentrated, may be a prag matic response, but is not justified in principle, and the fifth objection may therefore be dismissed.
We are now nearing the end of an argument that has suggested that moral accountability is not in princi ple restricted to humans (Part Two), that nonhumans do act in the world (Part Three), that technologies are not just tools or "dumb instruments (Part Four), that they materialize will and forethought of consequences (Part Five), and that the "dilution of responsibility" poses no barrier to moral accountability. In the next and last episode we conclude by consid ering whether this argument is just an abstract mind game, or whether it has a realworld application.
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Conclusion
In a series of installments it has been argued that moral agents are not in principle limited to members of the human race, that non-humans and in particular technologies can be considered to act in the world, and that when they do so, they cannot be regarded as just tools or dumb instruments, that the ac tions of technologies are willful and occur in the foreknowledge of consequences, in a significant way, and that even technologies that are distributed in time and space may be defined with sufficient specificity to allocate moral accountability. Taken together, it has been argued that technologies are not innocent, and can be held to moral account.
But does any of this matter? Even if the argument is accepted and the actions of technologies become subject to moral evaluation as well as instrumental assessment, what are we going to do -put the Doctor's computer system in gaol? Send the axe to confession? Fine it? Execute it? Re-educate and rehabilitate technologies that are immoral?
Well, yes.
Although it is allowed that in a literal sense jail and fines might not work, a figurative execution or rehabilitation of non-human technologies are certainly options that should be considered.
Execution for example, is an attractive option in some circumstances. There are technologies whose constitution so well express an "in order to" that is aligned to bad outcomes, and whose actions are so deeply implicated in both the means and the ends of bad outcomes, that rehabilitation is improbable, and the permanent destruction of the technology (that is, execution) becomes the best way of avoiding those outcomes. One might think here of napalm, cluster bombs, CF2 spray, dioxin, battery cages, bear-bile milkers, automated spam, malware, and so forth. To blame humans and only humans for the acts of napalm, cluster bombs or CF2 spray, and to direct moral outrage at humans and only humans, whilst implicitly or explicitly finding the napalm, the cluster bombs or the CF2 spray in themselves irrelevant to a moral assessment, lying outside an ethical jurisdiction, and thereby innocent of all moral wrong, is nothing short of perverse. These technologies act in the world, the world is different for their actions, and at the very least, they share responsibility for the outcomes of their actions in the world. Accordingly, certain technologies should share the focus of moral outrage, and their moral assessment has a place in the restitution of moral order. Are Technologies Innocent?
Part Seven: Conclusion
The eradication of certain technologies on moral grounds will lead to better outcomes, but this can occur only if those technologies are held to bear responsibility for those outcomes. If we continue to conclude that all technologies are beyond moral accountability, and that only humans are morally responsible for bad outcomes, the technologies that might otherwise be eradicated will continue to threaten and cause tragedy, and technologies that might otherwise be rehabilitated will continue to cause nuisance and accident.
But to make decisions about which technologies are to be eradicated, and why, and how, and which are to be rehabilitated, and why, and how, requires a mode of technology assessment capable of reaching these decisions. To allow that technologies are legitimate subjects of moral assessment alters the grounds for assessment in ways that allow this. While considered beyond the ken of moral assessment, technologies may be judged only in instrumental terms. They may be held to be inefficient, inaccurate, slow, costly, cumbersome to use, and so on. But surely these are inadequate yardsticks to use to get the full measure of these powerful actors? An assessment of the actions of technologies that is limited to questions of accuracy, efficiency, effectiveness, or cost, does not begin to come to grips with their significance as actors, and falls far short of exhausting their implications. To draw on concepts from the moral domain is to assess their actions within an appropriate framework. Right and wrong, virtue and wickedness, good and bad, are yardsticks by which we can more meaningfully comment upon the actions of cluster bombs, CF2 spray, or automated spam. A position at the intersection of moral axes provides a more meaningful conceptual context, and provides a more appropriate language for the assessment of technologies than a position on instrumental axes. Only in a moral context can the actions of technologies be assessed with appropriate conceptual tools, and with appropriate power and authority.
